The labor markets of the US and many other OECD countries have become more "polarized" with demand for workers in the middle of the skill distribution falling relative to those at the top and (in recent years) also the bottom of the skill distribution. We test the hypothesis of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) that this is partly due to information and communication technologies (ICT) complementing highly educated workers and substituting for routine tasks often performed by middle educated workers (with little effect on low educated workers performing manual non-routine tasks). We use a new dataset on the US, Japan, and nine Western European countries between 1980 and 2004 finding evidence consistent with ICT-based polarization. We show that industries that experienced faster growth in ICT also experienced increases in relative demand for high education and falls in relative demand for mid-level education. Trade openness is also associated with polarization, but this is not robust to controls for technology (like R&D). Measured technologies can account for up to a quarter of the growth in demand for the college educated in OECD countries the last quarter century.
Introduction
The demand for more highly educated workers appears to have risen for many decades across OECD countries. Despite a large increase in the supply of such workers, the return to college education has not fallen. Indeed it has risen significantly since the early 1980s in the US, UK and many other nations (see Machin and Van Reenen, 2008) . The consensus view is that this increase in skill demand is linked to technological progress (e.g. Goldin and Katz, 2008) rather than increased trade with low wage countries (although see Krugman, 2008 , for some more revisionist views).
Recent analyses of data through the 2000s, however, suggest a more nuanced view of the change in demand for skills. Kearney (2007, 2008) use US data to show that although "upper tail" inequality (between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution) has continued to rise in an almost secular way over the last thirty years, "lower tail" inequality (between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the distribution) increased during the 1980s but has stayed relatively flat from around 1990. They also show a related pattern for different education groups, with college graduates' hourly wages rising relative to high school graduates since 1980, and high school graduates gaining relative to high school dropouts during the 1980s but not since then. When considering occupations, rather than education groups, Goos and Manning (2007) describe a polarization of the workforce by occupation: they show that in the UK, it is middle skilled occupations that have declined relative to both the highly skilled and low skilled occupations. Spietz-Oener (2006) finds related results for Germany and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) find similar results for several OECD countries 1 .
What could account for these trends? One explanation is that new tech-1 See also Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schonberg (2007) and Smith (2008) .
2 nologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICT) , are complementary with human capital and rapid falls in quality-adjusted ICT prices have therefore increased skill demand. There is a large body of literature broadly consistent with this notion 2 . A more nuanced view has been offered by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) who emphasize that ICT substitutes for routine tasks but complements non-routine analytical tasks. Many routine tasks were traditionally performed by less educated workers, such as assembly workers in a car factory, and many of the analytical non-routine tasks are performed by more educated workers such as consultants, advertising executives and physicians. However, many routine tasks are also performed in occupations employing middle educated workers, such as bank clerks, and these groups may find demand for their services falling as a result of computerization. Similarly many less educated workers are employed in non-routine tasks such as janitors or cab drivers, and these tasks are largely unaffected by ICT. Since the numbers of routine jobs in the traditional manufacturing sectors (like car assembly) declined substantially in the 1970s, the main effects of ICT in the 1990s and 2000s may have increased demand for highly educated workers at the expense of those in the middle of the educational distribution and leave the least educated (mainly working in non-routine manual jobs) largely unaffected.
Although this theory is attractive there is currently little direct international evidence that ICT causes a substitution from middle-skilled workers to high-skilled workers. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) show some consistent trends for the US and Autor and Dorn (2009) exploit spatial variation across the US to show that the growth in low skilled services has been faster in areas where initially there were high proportions of routine jobs.
In this paper we test the idea that ICT may be behind the polarization of the labor market by implementing a simple test using 25 years of international cross industry data. If the ICT-based explanation for polarization is correct, then we would expect to see that those industries and countries that had a faster growth in ICT experienced an increase in demand for college educated workers, but a relative decrease in demand for workers with intermediate levels of education. We
show that this is a robust feature of the data.
We exploit the new EUKLEMS database that disaggregates non-college workers into two groups: those with low education and those with "middle level"
education. For example, in the US the middle education group includes those with some college and high school graduates, but excludes high school drop-outs and GEDs (see Timmer et al, 2007, Table 5 .3 for the country specific breakdown).
It spans eleven developed economies (US, Japan, and nine countries in Western
Europe) and also contains data on ICT capital. In analyzing the data we consider not only the potential role of ICT, but also several alternative explanations. In particular, we examine whether the role of trade could have become more important in recent years (most of the early studies pre-dated the growth of China and India as major players).
The idea behind our empirical strategy is that the rapid fall in quality-adjusted ICT prices will have a greater effect in some country-industry pairs that are more reliant on ICT. This is because some industries are inherently more reliant on ICT than others. There is also some exogenous cross-country variation in any given industry since adoption of ICT may be harder due to regulatory constraints (e.g.
if labor regulations imply firing costs are high and ICT implies laying off unskilled workers, adoption of ICT may be less attractive in countries with tougher labor market regulation 3 ). We have no compelling natural experiment, however, so our 3 Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007) show some evidence that tougher labor regulations 4 results should be seen as conditional correlations. We do, however, consider some instrumental variable strategies using the industry-specific base year levels of US routine tasks (and/or US ICT intensity) as an instrument for subsequent ICT increases in other countries.
We conclude that technology measures (both ICT and R&D) has continued to exert upward demand for college educated workers and, consistent with the proponents of the ICT-based polarization hypothesis, has come mainly from reducing the demand for middle skilled workers rather than low skilled workers.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the empirical model, section III the data and section IV the empirical results. Section V offers some concluding comments.
Empirical Model
Consider the short-run variable cost function, CV (.):
where W indicates wages and superscripts denote education/skill group S, H = highly educated workers, M = middle educated workers and L = low educated workers, K = non-ICT capital services, C = ICT capital services and Q = value added. If we assume that the capital stocks are quasi-fixed, factor prices are exogenous and that the cost function can be approximated by a second order flexible functional form such as translog then cost minimization (using Shephard's Lemma) implies the following three skill share equations:
in Europe, may have been a reason for slower adoption of ICT than the US.
where
is the wage bill share of skill group S = {H, M, L}. Our hypothesis of the ICT-based polarization theory is that α H > 0 and α M < 0 4 . If ICT only affects the relative demand between the top two skill groups leaving the less educated unaffected then a stronger hypothesis is
Our empirical specifications are based on these equations. We assume that labor markets are national in scope and include country by time effects to capture relative wages (φ jt ). We also assume that there is unobserved heterogeneity between industry by country pairs (η ij ) and include fixed effects to account for these.
where i = industry, j =country and t = year. We estimate in long (25 year) differences, ∆,to look at the historical trends and smooth out measurement error.
We substitute levels rather than logs (i.e. ∆(C/Q) instead of ∆ ln(C/Q)) because of the very large changes in ICT intensity over this time period. Some industry by country pairs had close to zero IT intensity in 1980 so their change is astronomical in logarithmic terms. Consequently our three key estimating equations are:
In the robustness tests we also consider augmenting equation (2.6) in various ways. Since ICT is only one aspect of technical change we also consider using
Research and Development expenditures (R&D). Additionally, we consider trade variables (such as imports plus exports over value added) to test whether industries that were exposed to more trade upgraded the skills of their workforce at a more rapid rate than those who did not. This is a pragmatic empirical approach to examining trade effects. Under a strict Heckscher-Ohlin approach trade is a general equilibrium effect increasing wage inequality throughout the economy so looking at the variation by industry would be uninformative. However, since trade costs have declined more rapidly in some sectors than others (e.g. due to trade liberalization) we would expect the actual flows of trade to proxy this change and there to be a larger effect on workers in these sectors than in others who were less affected (Krugman, 2008 , makes this argument).
Appendix A considers a theoretical model with parameter restrictions over equation (2.1) that implies that ICT is a substitute for middle skilled labor and a complement with highly skilled labor. Comparative static results from the model suggest that as ICT increases (caused by a fall in the quality-adjusted price of ICT) the wage bill share of skilled workers rises and the share of middle skilled workers falls. It also shows that all else equal an exogenous increase in the supply of middle skilled workers will cause their wage bill share to rise. Thus, although ICT could reduce the demand for the middle skilled group their share could still rise because of the long-run increase in supply.
3. Data
Data Construction
The main source of data for this paper is the EUKLEMS dataset which contains data on value added, labor, capital, skills and ICT for various industries in many developed countries (see Timmer et al, 2007) . The EUKLEMS data are constructed using data from each country's National Statistical Office (e.g. the US
Census Bureau) and harmonized with each country's national accounts. The EU-KLEMS data contains some data on most OECD countries. But since we require data on skill composition, investment and value added between 1980 and 2004, our sample of countries is restricted to eleven: Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA 5 .
Another choice we had to make regards the set of industries we analyze. Since our baseline year (1980) was close to the peak of the oil boom, we have dropped from the sample mining and quarrying, coke manufactures, or the supply of natural gas (we also report results that are robust to including this two digit sectors).
The remaining sample includes 30 industries in each country (see Appendix Table   A1 ). But wage data by skill category is only reported separately by industry in some countries. We therefore aggregate industries to the lowest possible level of aggregation for which all the variables we use could be constructed -the precise level of disaggregation varied by country (see Appendix level of industry aggregation. 7 In two countries the classification of high skilled workers is different: in Denmark it includes people in "long cycle" higher education and in Finland it includes people with tertiary education or higher.
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 (5)). Figure 1A shows graphically that the four countries with the highest rates of ICT upgrading (US, UK, Netherlands, and Finland) were also the four countries with the highest increases in the college wage bill share. By contrast, the correlation between ICT upgrading and the change in share of the middle skilled group is -0.33 ( Figure 1B ): those countries with the fastest ICT increase had the greatest fall in demand for workers of intermediate skill. Interestingly, for the low skilled group this correlation is close to zero (0.03).
The changes of the shares of the middle education group in column (2) of Table 1 Table 2 contains the breakdowns by industry. In levels (column (1)) the highly educated were disproportionately clustered into services both in the public sector (especially education) and private sector (real estate and business services). The industries that upgraded rapidly (column (8)) were also mainly services -financial intermediation, telecommunications, business services and public administrationbut there were also a few manufacturing sectors (e.g. chemicals and electrical equipment). At the other end of the skill distribution, the textile industry, which initially had the lowest wage bill share of skilled workers, upgraded somewhat more than other low skill industries (transport and storage, construction, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture). This raises the issue of mean reversion, so we are careful to show robustness tests to conditioning on the initial levels of the skill shares in our regressions. In fact, the ranking of industries in terms of skill Figure 3A shows that there is a strong positive association between the growth of industry ICT intensity and the industry share of the college educated. We were concerned that the results could be driven by two large service sectors (telecommunications and finance) so we focus on the tradeable sectors in Figure 3B which shows and even stronger relationship. Figure   4 show the opposite result for the medium skilled -there is a negative relationship between growth of ICT intensity and the change in the share of medium skilled workers which grows stronger when we focus on the traded goods sectors. Finally, Figure 5 shows that there is essentially no relationship (or even a positive one) between ICT growth and the fall in the share of unskilled workers These figures suggest that ICT could be the factor behind polarization as it has a strong negative association with the demand for middle skilled workers, a positive association with the most skilled workers and little relationship with the demand for the least skilled workers. To examine this possible link more carefully, 12 we now turn to our regression analysis.
Results

Technology and Skill Upgrading
Our first set of results for the skill share regressions at the industry by country pair level is contained in Table 3 . The dependent variable is the change of the skill share which is college-educated in Panel A, the intermediate educated group
in Panel B and the least educated group in Panel C. All equations are estimated in 24 year long differences. The first four columns look across the entire economy and the last four columns condition on the sub-sample of "tradable" sectors where we have information on imports and exports.
Turning first to Panel A, column (1) simply reports the coefficient on the constant that indicates that, on average there was a ten percentage point increase in the share of the wage bill accruing to college educated workers. This is a very large increase, considering the average skill share in 1980 (across our sample of countries) was only 14 percentage points. Column (2) includes the growth in ICT capital intensity. The technology variable has a large, positive and significant coefficient and reduces the regression constant by about 13 percent (to 8.7 percentage points). The importance of technology for skill upgrading is consistent with other work which has found technology-skill complementarity. Column (3) includes the growth of non-ICT capital intensity and value added. The coefficient on non-ICT capital is negative and insignificant which suggests that there is no sign of capital-skill complementarity. Some studies have found capital-skill complementarity (e.g. Griliches, 1969) but few of these studies have disaggregated capital into its ICT and non-ICT components, so the evidence for capital-skill complementarity may be due to aggregating over high-tech capital which is complementary with skills and lower tech capital which is not. Similarly few studies 13 have looked over such a long time span as we do in this paper. The coefficient on value added growth is positive and significant suggesting that skill upgrading has been occurring more rapidly in the fastest growing sectors (this is consistent with Berman , Rohini and Tan, 2005) . Column (4) includes country fixed effects. This is a demanding specification because the specification is already in differences so this specification essentially allows for country specific trends. The coefficient on ICT falls (from 65 to 47) but remains significant at conventional levels 9 .
We repeat these specifications for the tradeable industries. Column (5) shows that the overall increase in the college wage-bill share from 1980-2004 is 9 percentage points -similar to that in the whole sample. Columns (6) - (8) add in our measure of ICT and other controls. The coefficient on ICT in the tradeable sector is larger than in the overall sample.
Panel B of Table 3 repeats these specifications middle-skilled workers. Column
(1) shows that overall, the growth of the wage bill share of middle skilled workers has been 8.7 percentage points over this time period. But as the rest of the panel shows, the association between the change in middle-skilled workers and ICT is strongly negative. The absolute magnitude of the coefficients for the sample that includes all industries is quite similar to those for college educated workers, especially when we add in the full set of controls (including 1980 shares of college educated workers and middle-skilled workers).
Panel C holds the low-skilled worker results -the coefficients can all be deduced from the rest of Table 3 , but the standard errors are useful to see. Importantly, the technology measures appear to be insignificant for this group of workers illustrating the point that the main role of ICT appears to be in changing demand 9 Including the mineral extraction sectors caused the ICT coefficient to fall from 47 to 45. We also tried including a set of industry dummies in column (4). All the variables became insignificant in this specification. This suggests that it is the same industries that are upgrading across countries. 14 between the top and the middle skill groups 10 . Since the adding up requirement means that the coefficients for the least skilled group can be deduced from the other two skill groups we save space by omitting Panel C in the rest of the Tables. Table 4 examines some robustness checks using the results in column (4) of (2) and (3) condition on the sub-sample of Continental European countries (i.e. excluding the US, UK, and Japan) and show qualitatively similar results to the pooled sample. Unfortunately, the sample size for most individual countries is rather small preventing a full country by country analysis (due to the above-mentioned restriction that wage bill data is aggregated for some industries in most countries).
For example, column (4) suggests that for the US the correlation between ICT and polarization is larger in magnitude than for the full sample, though column (5) shows that the estimates become imprecise when we control for baseline levels of skill composition.
Another concern for our estimates is that measurement error in the right hand side variables, especially ICT, causes attenuation bias 11 . To mitigate this concern, we use the industry-level measures of ICT in the US in 1980 as an instrument for ICT upgrading over the entire sample. The reasoning behind this instrument is that if major technological changes emanate from the US, subsequent falls in 10 The difference in the importance of ICT for the middle and lowest skill groups implies that high school graduates are not perfect substitutes for college graduates as Card (2009) argues. The majority of our data is from outside the US, however, where there are relatively fewer high school graduates.12 . In the 2SLS estimates of column (6) the coefficient on ICT is roughly twice as large as the OLS coefficients for the college educated group (and significant at the 5 percent level), and a little bigger for the middle skill group. Column (7) report estimates the same specification but this time excluding the US itself, and the results are very similar. We also considered using the proportion of routine manual tasks in the industry (in the US in the base year) as an instrument for future ICT growth as these industries were most likely to be affected by falling ICT prices (see Autor and Dorn, 2009 ). The results of using these instruments are shown in columns (8) and (9). Again, these columns suggest that we may be under-estimating the importance of ICT by just using OLS: there is certainly no evidence of downward bias 13 .
Trade, R&D and skill upgrading
Having found that technology upgrading is associated with substitution of collegeeducated workers for middle-skilled workers, we now examine whether changes in trade exhibit similar patterns. The first two columns of Table 5 suggest that more trade openness (measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to value added) is associated with increases in the wage bill share of college educated workers, at least once we control for country time trends in column (2). Adding our measures of ICT, value added and non-ICT capital weakens this result in column (3), but the trade measure remains significant. However, the last two columns of Table 5 suggests that when we control for initial R&D intensity the association between trade and skill upgrading becomes much smaller and ceases to be statistically 12 The first-stage F-statistic is around 9, suggesting that the instrument has some power but is not very strong. 13 The signs of the instruments in the first stage are correct, but the F-tests suggest that they are weaker than we would like (F-tests of between 6.5 in column (6) to 10.5 in column (9)). significant. Column (4) repeats the specification of column (3) for the sub-sample where we have R&D data and shows that the trade coefficient is robust. Column (5) includes R&D intensity in a simple specification and shows that the coefficient on trade halves (from 0.5 to 0.24) and is insignificant, whereas the coefficient on R&D is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. In column (6) 
Magnitudes
We perform some "back of the envelope" calculations in Table 6 to gauge the magnitude of the "effect" of technology on the demand for highly skilled workers.
Column (1) estimates that ICT accounts for 13.2 percent of the increase in the college share in the whole sample without controls and column (2) reduces this to 8.5 percent with controls. Many authors (e.g. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2008) have argued that value added growth has been strongly affected by ICT growth, especially in the later period, so column (2) We have no general equilibrium model, so these are only "back of the envelope" calculations to give an idea of magnitudes. Furthermore, measurement error probably means that we are probably underestimating the importance of the variables. Nevertheless, it seems that our measures of technology are important in explaining a significant proportion of the increase in demand for college educated workers at the expense of the middle skilled.
Conclusions
Recent investigations into the changing demand for skills in OECD countries have found some evidence for "polarization" in the labour market in the sense that workers in the middle of the wage and skills distribution appear to have fared more poorly than those at the bottom and the top. One explanation that has been advanced for this is that ICT has complemented non-routine analytic tasks but substituted for routine tasks whilst not affecting non-routine manual tasks Although our method is simple and transparent, there are many extensions that need to be made. First, alternative instrumental variables for ICT would help identify the causal impact of ICT. As with the existing literature, we do not have strong instruments for ICT. Second, although we find no direct role for trade variables, there may be other ways in which globalization influences the labour market, for example by causing firms to "defensively innovate" (Acemoglu, 2003) . Third, there are alternative explanations for the improved performance of the least skilled group through for example, greater demand from richer skilled workers for the services they provide as market production substitutes for household production (e.g. childcare, eating out in restaurants, domestic work, etc.) 17 .
These explanations may complement the mechanism we address here. A. Theory Appendix: A simple model of the effect of ICT on demand for three skill groups.
We present a toy model that illustrates how we could derive the relationships we observe in the data. The exogenous variable is an increase in ICT capital generated by a large fall in ICT prices. The prediction is that we can observe an increase in the share of the high skilled and a decline in the share of the middle skilled. Note that an increase in the supply of the middle skilled will also generate an increase in their wage bill share. The model below considers an aggregate (sectoral) production function using 3 labor inputs: low skilled (L), middle skilled (M), and high skilled (H) workers and ICT capital (C). The model also assumes a constant elasticity of substitution σ = (0, 1). We assume that output, Q, is produced using the following production function:
where α j denotes the effectiveness of each type of labor, j ∈ {L, M, H}. β measures the effectiveness of ICT in substituting middle skilled labor and γ measures ICT effectiveness in complementing high skilled labor. The model assumes that ICT capital (C) is a substitute for middle skilled workers, and a complement to high skilled labor, where η = 1 1−μ ∈ (0, 1), so μ < 0. Note that the model the model only treats the relationship between C and H in exactly the opposite way from the relationship between C and M if η −→ 0 (or equivalently μ −→ −∞).
Assuming perfect competition, the wage of the three types of labor and the cost of ICT are:
In this model an increase in ICT raises the wage of high skilled and low skilled workers, but has an ambiguous effect on the wage of middle skilled workers:
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The wage bill shares of the three types of labor are:
One can verify that in this specification
So increased supply of ICT raises the college wage bill share and reduces the middle skilled wage bill share. It is also the case the ratio of the wage bill of high skilled workers to low skilled workers increases with ICT,
Note that an increase in the supply of middle skilled workers raises their wage bill relative to low skilled workers:
B. Data Appendix
Our main dataset is EUKLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/) which is an industrylevel panel dataset created by economic researchers funded by the European Commission. It covers all Member States in Europe plus the US and Japan and contains a wealth of information on productivity related variables. These were constructed through working with the Census Bureau in each country and are designed to be internationally comparable. Details of the methodology are in Timmer et al (2007) . In the construction of our sample we faced a number of technical issues. First, although college wage bill shares are reported for 30 industries in each country, these reported wage bill shares are not unique within each country. For example, in a certain country the reported college wage bill share for industry A and industry B may be (college wage bill in A + college wage bill in B)/ (total wage bill in A + total wage bill in B). The identity and number of industries pooled together vary across countries. In order to use as much of variation as possible, we aggregate industries within each country up to the lowest level of aggregation that ensures that the college wage bill share is unique across the aggregated observations. This is also sufficient to ensure that other variables we use, such as our ICT and value added measures, have unique values across observations. Second, matching trade variables into our main dataset required data required currency conversions, since EUKLEMS reports data in historical local currency and COMTRADE reports data in historical dollars. To overcome this difference, we convert nominal values to current US Dollars using exchange rates from the IMF IFS website. To convert national currency to the Euro (for Eurozone countries), we use exchange rates from the website:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/transition/conversion_rates.htm We use trade figures from the UN's COMTRADE dataset. Data is downloaded in the four digit Standard International Trade Classification format (revision 2), and converted to the European NACE Rev 1 classification used in the EUKLEMS dataset. (Concordance available on request). Our trade regressions contain the updated data from 21st March 2008.
To decompose trade into OECD versus non-OECD, we use the 2007 definition of OECD countries (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the USA). This means that Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and Belgium-Luxembourg were treated as OECD countries in 1980.
Third, we account for the fact that these (aggregated) industries differ substantially in their employment shares within each country's population. We therefore use the employment shares of each industry in 1980 (our base year) in total employment as analytical weights in the regressions using both tradable and non-tradable industries. For trade regressions, which use only the non-traded industries, each industry's weight is its employment share in the non-traded industries for that country, so that the sum of weights for each country is still unity.
Finally, we use ICT capital compensation divided by value added as our measure of ICT intensity directly from EUKLEMs. ICT capital compensation is the stock of ICT capital (built from the Perpetual Inventory method based on nominal investment flows divided by a quality adjusted price deflator) multiplied by its user cost. Non-ICT capital compensation is built in the same way. Because EUKLEMS calculates capital compensation as a residual in some cases observations can have negative capital compensation. Of the 208 country-industry cells we use, negative capital compensation occurs in 12 cases in 1980 and in 3 cases in 2004. These are typically agriculture (which is heavily subsidized and becomes smaller over time) and industries where public services play an important role (e.g. education and health). To overcome this problem, we bottom-coded negative values of ICT and non-ICT capital compensation to zero. Our results are robust to dropping these observations from the sample (see robustness section). Autor, Levy and Murnane(2003) Note: Figure 1 plots the growth of high, medium and low-skilled college wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity for 11 OECD countries (see Table 1 ). Lines show regressions of the growth of each wage bill share against growth of ICT intensity. Figure 3 plots the growth of high-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity for all goods and for traded goods (see Table 2 ). Lines show regression of the growth of high-skilled wage bill shares against growth of ICT intensity, weighted by the cross-country average of each industry's share in 1980 employment. Note: Figure 4 plots the growth of medium-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity for all goods and for traded goods (see Table 2 ). Lines show regression of the growth of medium-skilled wage bill shares against growth of ICT intensity, weighted by the cross-country average of each industry's share in 1980 employment. Change Low-Skilled Note: Figure 5 plots the growth of low-skilled wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity for all goods and for traded goods (see Table 2 ). Lines show regression of the growth of low-skilled wage bill shares against growth of ICT intensity, weighted by the cross-country average of each industry's share in 1980 employment. 
